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NOTES
THE RULE OF LAW IN COLONIAL MASSA=CUSBTTS
INTRODUCTION
The belief that law ought to rule over governor and governed alike in
human society-a concept known to the modern world as "the rule of
law"--may be traced to the political and legal philosophies of the Classical
world that underlay medieval thought.' In modern societies the rule of law
has ordinarily taken the form of the supremacy of fundamental laws em-
bodied either in a written constitution, in the gradual accretion of statutory
and judge-made law, or in a combination thereof. As it is understood
today, the rule of law requires, as a corollary to adherence to a law that is
binding upon ruler and ruled alike, recognition and enforcement of basic
rights inhering to the individual in his relations with the state. It denies
arbitrary power to the government by requiring that no person be made
to suffer in body or goods unless by regular legal process. It requires
equality of treatment, in the sense that every man is subject to the ordinary
law of the land and to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, and in the
further sense that the government may not discriminate arbitrarily among
individuals or classes in its official acts.
2
The popular image of the Puritan society of the Massachusetts Bay
Colony as a narrowly intolerant theocracy in which Biblical law was applied
with harsh and devastating literalism and individual liberties were sternly
suppressed does not comport with modern notions of the rule of law. That
image has been fostered by historians who have applied the value judg-
ments of their own age to a society whose values were markedly different.
Regarding such persons as Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson as
protagonists of freedom in a struggle with the forces of intolerance repre-
sented by men like John Winthrop and John Cotton, they have emphasized
the severity and intolerant ends of Puritan law; there has been little effort
to account for this system of justice in terms of the ideas and presupposi-
tions of the time of which they were a product.3 However, careful exam-
ination of the colony's political and legal institutions and critical comparison
' See generally CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (1955); DICKINSON, ADINIsTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPRIACY
OF LAw IN THE UNITED STATES 76-104 (1927); MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF
PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY 42-108 (1910).
2Cf. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
198-99 (7th ed. 1908).
3 See, e.g., ADAMs, THE FOUNDING OF NEW ENGLAND (1921); MoRIsoN, BUILDmS
OF THE BAY COLONY 244-68 (1930).
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of them with contemporary English institutions have led other scholars to
conclude that the rule of law in its modem sense, entailing the recognition
of basic individual rights, was operative in the Puritan colony.4
The so-called "higher law background" of American constitutional
law has been developed with insight and clarity in studies by distinguished
legal scholars. 5 Their emphasis, however, has been principally upon the
origins, in older notions of fundamental law, of the device of judicial review
of governmental acts for attaining conformity to constitutional standards.
Because this mechanism was unknown in the Massachusetts Bay Colony,
studies of the influence of the tradition of fundamental law upon American
constitutional history have paid little attention to the impact of the same
tradition upon the colony's political and legal institutions and upon.the men
who framed and administered them.
The purpose of this Note is to relate the concept of the rule of law
to the foundation and early history of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The
origins of the idea of the rule of law in the Puritans' intellectual heritage
are examined, and its form and application analyzed, in terms of the laws
and political arrangements of the colony struggling to establish a "due forme
of Government" in the New England wilderness.6 The legal and political
ideas of John Winthrop serve as the focus of discussion.7 As will be seen,
his version of the rule of law was ultimately rejected in substantial measure
during the rapid political evolution that characterized the colony's first
twenty years." Nevertheless, his influence in Massachusetts far exceeded
that of any other man during his lifetime, and the principles he advocated
remained a vital force in the colony's law and politics long after his death
4 See, e.g., HAsKiNs, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS (1960) ;
Riesenfeld, Law Making and Legislative Precedent in American Legal History, 33
MINN. L. REv. 103 (1949).
5 See, e.g., CoRwiN, op. cit. supra note 1; DIcKINsoN, op. cit. supra note 1.
6 Limitations of space have required that this examination and analysis be selec-
tive and illustrative rather than comprehensive. Consequently, this Note does not
attempt a general treatment of the social and political history of the colony although
passing references to that history are made where they have been thought necessary.
7 For a general treatment of Winthrop's political philosophy see Gray, The Politi-
cal Thought of John Winthrop, 3 N. ENG. Q. 681 (1930). MORGAN, THE PURITAN
DILEMMA: THE STORY OF JOHN WINTHROP (1958), is a recent biography, and MoRI-
SON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 51-104, contains a good brief account of Winthrop's life
and influence. Winthrop was born in 1588 at Groton, Suffolk. His grandfather, a
prosperous master clothier, had purchased the manor of Groton, formerly held by
the Abbey of Bury St. Edmunds, after its seizure by the Crown during the reign of
Henry VIII. Winthrop's father had practiced law in London for a time, and Winthrop
himself was trained in the common law at the Inns of Court after attending Cambridge
University. Uupon the death of his father he inherited the Manor of Groton, with the
right to hold courts baron and courts leet. Commissioned a justice of the peace for
the County of Suffolk at the age of eighteen, he served as Attorney in the Court
of Wards and Liveries. Id. at 51-53, 66. Winthrop was thus exposed not only to the
common law applied in the King's courts, but also to the special, customary rules and
procedures followed in the local courts and to the broad and varied administrative
and criminal jurisdiction exercised by the English "country 'justice" sitting in the
petty and quarter sessions of the peace.
8 See text accompanying notes 185-90 infra.
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in 1649. More importantly, an examination of his conception of the proper
interrelationship of law, authority and obligation serves to illuminate the
content of the rule of law that evolved from the vigorous conflict between
his ideas and those of his opponents within the colony.9
FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLAND
Law and Custom
There was general agreement among Englishmen of the seventeenth
century that all political power is limited by principles which the holder of
the power is incapable of changing.10 Belief in an eternal and immutable
law to which the acts of human rulers should conform had become a part
of the common Christian tradition of Europe through the Church's adoption
of substantial portions of Classical thought and methodology." And the
medieval revival of Roman law had led to wide acceptance of the notion of
a us gentium, embodying rules of universal application in human societies.-
2
English notions of fundamental law, however, owed more to Germanic ideas
of custom and law than to the traditions of the Roman Church and juris-
prudence. Through the influence of the Tentonic tribal society, law in the
medieval world was ordinarily conceived of as immemorial custom.
Medieval law must be "old" law and it must be "good" law. Hence it was
not something to be made or created; legislation was not an assertion of will,
but a promulgation of what was recognized as already binding upon men in
society. 13 Greek and Roman ideas of fundamental law became known in
England during the Middle Ages through the influence of the Roman law
and the Scholastic writers,14 but those concepts were not adopted in them-
selves so much as they were applied, as a sort of grammar, in the phil-
osophical analysis and justification of the customary, "common" law of
the land.
9 See text accompanying notes 129-43, 185-90 infra.
10 See generally DIcKINSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 76-95; GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL
LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 1-65 (1955); McILwAIN, CoNsTITU-
TIONALIsm ANCIENT AND MODERN 69-125 (1940).
11See generally D'ENTRAVWS, THE MEDIEVAL CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL
THOUGHT 1-43 (1939).
12 MCILwVAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 43-68.
13 DICKINSON, op. cit. mpra note 1, at 85-86; for an extended treatment of the
so-called Germanic conception of the law, see KERN, KINGSHIP AND LAW IN THE
MIDDLE AGES 149-80 (1939).
'4 E.g., The Policraticus of John of Salisbury, written in 1159 by an English
churchman who was later exiled by Henry II for his support of Thomas i Becket, has
been described as "the outstanding treatise on political theory before the work of
Aquinas . . ." 1 LEwIs, MEDIEVAL POLITICAL IDEAS 169 (1954). Citing the
Digest, Demosthenes and holy scripture, he rejected the contention that "the prince
is . . . loosed from the bonds of the law . . ." and asked, "but who speaks of the
will of the prince in public affairs, since in these affairs it is not licit for him to will
anything except what law or equity persuades or the consideration of the common
utility requires ?" THE POLICRATICUS OF JOHN OF SALISBURY bk. 4, ch. 2 (Webb ed.
1909), quoted in 1 LEwis, op cit. supra at 172.
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Christopher Saint Germain's Doctor and Student, 5 published in 1523,
illustrates the pragmatic English approach to natural law. "It is not used
among them that be learned in the laws of England," he said, "to reason
what thing is commanded or prohibited by the law of nature, and what not,
but all the reasoning is under this manner. As when anything is grounded
upon the law of nature, they say, that reason will that such a thing be done;
and if it be prohibited by the law of nature, they say it is against reason,
or that reason will not suffer that to be done." I' For the English lawyer
of the time of James I, no less than for his predecessors a century before,
the common law was equated with custom which had proved its reasonable-
ness by long persistence. In 1610, Sir John Davies, Attorney General for
Ireland, stated in the dedication of his Irish Reports that "the Common
Law of England is nothing else but the Common Custome of the Realm"
and described the process by which custom acquired the force of law as
follows:
"When a reasonable act once done is found to be good and beneficiall
to the people, and agreeable to their nature and disposition, then do
they use it and practise it again and again, and so by often iteration and
multiplication of the act it becometh a Custome; and being continued
without interruption time out of mind, it obtaineth the force of a
Law." 17
A similar conception of the relation between common law and custom on the
basis of conformity to reason had led Saint Germain to state that "it is
many times very hard and of great difficulty to know what cases of the law
of England be grounded upon the law of reason, and what upon custom
of the realm. . ." 18
Law and Consent
From earliest times, notions of the nature of law had been closely bound
up with the idea of popular consent. The belief that the acts of the ruler
derive their legitimacy from the consent of those whom he rules is traceable
in part to Germanic tribal traditions and in part to Roman constitutional
principles mirrored in the revived Roman law.19 The Anglo-Saxon codes
and the laws of Canute recognized the principle of consent, and the years
following the Norman conquest witnessed the gradual merger of that
15 SAINT GERMAIN, THE DOCTOR AND STUDENT OR DIALOGUES BETWEEN A DOCTOR
OF DIVINITY AND A STUDENT IN THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Muchall ed. 1874).
16 Id. at 12 (Dialogue I, ch. v).
17Preface Dedicatory, in LE PRIMER REPORT DES CASES ET MATTERS EN LEY,
RESOLUES & ADIUDGES EN LES COURTS DEL ROY EN IRELAND. COLLECT & DIGEST PER
SR. IOHN DAVYS CEIUALER, ATTURNEY GENERALL DEL ROY EN CEST REALME (1st ed.
1628) (unpaginated).
18 SAINT GERMAIN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 33 (Dialogue I, ch. ix).
19 CLARKE, MEDIEVAL REPRESENTATION AND CONSENT 247-50 (1936).
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doctrine with Roman-feudal notions of counsel and consent.2 0 Thus
Bracton stated in the opening paragraph of his treatise on the laws and
customs of England that:
"Whereas in almost all countries they use laws and unwritten right,
England alone uses within her boundaries unwritten right and custom.
In England, indeed, right is derived from what is unwritten, which
usage has approved. But it will not be absurd to call the English laws,
although they are unwritten, by the name of Laws, for everything has
the force of Law, whatever has been rightfully defined and approved
by the counsel and consent of the magnates, with the common warrant
of the body politic, the authority of the king or the prince preceding." 
2 1
The doctrine of consent and the notion that law was found, not made, were
frequently coupled in English legal and political thought. Sir John
Fortescue, writing a few years before the accession of the Tudor Henry VII
to the throne, restated the medieval ideal at a time when its values and
assumptions were about to come under attack by new social and political
theories and by the encroachments of a succession of vigorous monarchs.
Fortescue distinguished between the dominium regale of the French
monarchy, by which the King "may rule his People by such Lawys as he
makyth hymself; and therefor he may set upon them Talys, and other Im-
positions, such as he wyl hymself, without their Assent," and the dominium
politicale et regale which characterized the English system wherein the
King "may not rule hys People, by other awys than such as they assenten
unto." 22
Sovereignty
The Tudor monarchs established justification and popular support for
the constitutional changes of the sixteenth century by enhancing the par-
ticipation of Parliament in the government; however, they skillfully guided
parliamentary action so as to insure conformity to the royal policies.
23
"We be informed by our judges," said Henry VIII in a speech to the
Commons, "that at no time do we stand so highly in our estate royal as in
the time of parliament, wherein we as head and you as members are con-
joined and knit together in one body politic." 24 The Tudors' shrewd use
of the conception of government by "the King-in-Parliament" afforded a
means by which their "practical despotism" could be implemented con-
20 Id. at 249.
21 1 BRACTON, DE Lnswus ET CONSTETUDINiBUS ANGLiAE 3 (Twiss ed. 1878).
2 2 
FoRTEScUE, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN ABSOLUTE AND LIMITED MONARCHY
2-3 (Fortescue-Aland ed. 1714).
23 See generally HASKINS, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN-
MENT 123-27 (1948); MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 251-75
(1941).
2 4 Quoted in HASKINS, op. cit. supra note 23, at 124.
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sistently with English ideas of fundamental law as a limiting agency.
Despite the increase in parliamentary legislative activity during the Tudor
period-so striking to modern historians-neither the Parliament nor the
people affected by its statutes thought of that activity in clear terms of
"making" law. There was an evident growth of awareness that Parliament
might in fact create "new law," 25 but the medieval idea of law as a promul-
gation of what was recognized as already binding retained considerable
vitality throughout the sixteenth century and well into the seventeenth. 8 A
perceptive mid-sixteenth century observer, who said of the members of
Parliament that "they render the absolute and royal power legitimate," 27
recognized both the developing fact of royal sovereignty and the popular
participation therein which helped to insure the remarkable success of the
administrative and legislative innovations of the Tudors. Their astute en-
listment of the aid of Parliament in accomplishing their purposes preserved
much of the vigor of the idea of the dominium politicale et regale during
a period in which a progressive concentration of power in the Crown was
setting the stage for Stuart pretensions of absolutism. Thus, although the
English monarchs from Henry VII through Elizabeth brought about im-
portant changes in the English constitutional fabric, these alterations were
effected without doing readily apparent violence to inherited legal and po-
litical ideas.
It is clear enough to the modem observer that the statutes of the Tudor
period were enacted by a power that was virtually unlimited. But the fact
that they issued from "the King-in-Parliament" bolstered the arguments of
later theorists of parliamentary sovereignty. This theory was not clearly
articulated before the time of Hobbes and did not gain full recognition
until well into the eighteenth century.28  For the most part the contem-
poraries of Coke were not intellectually equipped to conceive of sovereignty
as vested in the parliamentary assembly. As Maitland has pointed out,
Parliament depended on the King's will "for its constitution, for its very
25 See the discussion in GouGE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 14-29. Mr. Gough
observes that "in Brooke's Abridgement, which was compiled in 1573, we find the
distinction between statutes which affirm the common law and statutes which create
new law, whereas in Fitzherberts Abridgement, which dates from before the Refor-
mation Parliament, this distinction does not appear." Id. at 27.
26 See, e.g., the assertion by the royalist Judge Jenkins from his cell in the Tower
of London in 1647: "The Law of this Land hath three grounds: First Custome, Sec-
ondly, Judiciall Records, Thirdly, Acts of Parliament. The two latter are but dec-
larations of the Common-Law and Custome of the Realme, touching Royall Govern-
ment. And this Law of Royall Government is a Law Fundamentall." THaE WORKS
OF J -UDGE JENKINS 5 (1648), quoted in MCILwAIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 85-86.
The "Royall Government" to which Jenkins alludes is the royal prerogative which
the Stuart kings vigorously asserted and their Parliaments as vigorously resisted;
his use of the "declaratory" theory of legislation to uphold the argument that the
Crown's prerogative power was a "Law Fundamentall" demonstrates how both
parties in the constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century could enlist the aid
of familiar English fundamental law concepts.
,27 Quoted in HASKINS, op. cit. supra note 23, at 124. The observer was the
Venetian ambassador, Barbaro.
28 MAITAND, op. cit. sipra note 23, at 267-75, 297-301.
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existence .... ,, 29 Parliament convened upon his call and disbanded
upon his order. He could create lords temporal and spiritual and charter
new boroughs with representation in Commons. In a very real sense the
Parliament of the Tudor and early Stuart periods was itself an emanation
of the royal power; thus there was considerable basis for the claims of the
supporters of James I and Charles I that royal consultation of Parliament
amounted to little more than a moral obligation. 0
Holdsworth has observed that no Englishman of the Tudor period
"could have given an answer to the question as to the whereabouts of
the sovereign power in the English state. The doctrine of sovereignty
was a new doctrine in the sixteenth century; nor is it readily grasped
until the existence of a conflict between several competitors for political
power makes it necessary to decide which of these various competitiors
can in the last resort enforce its will." 31
The conflict to which Holdsworth alludes materialized in the bitter con-
stitutional struggle commencing with the accession of James I to the
English throne. The participants in this contest for sovereignty were
eventually narrowed to the royal and parliamentary powers; at the begin-
ning of the seventeenth century, however, the rivalry was three-sided.3 2
The claims of Parliament were asserted almost without recognition of their
ultimate tendency, and the articulate opposition to the claims of the Crown
was asserted in large part in terms of the supremacy of the law. Sir
Edward Coke, the leading exponent of the latter view, intimated that a
judge might even hold a statute void-either because it was against the law
of nature expressed through the common law or because it encroached
upon the undoubted power of the King.3 3 It is doubtful whether many of
the party who opposed the Stuart assertions of divine right thought in terms
of a judicial supremacy exercised through the assessment of legislative
action against a natural and customary common law which was immutable
and independent of the legislative will. It has been suggested that even
Coke did not believe in the supremacy of such a law, but rather in the
supremacy of a law that Parliament could change.34 Whatever may have
motivated Coke and his fellows in their arguments, it is evident that they
were led by their assumed equation of the law of reason with the common
law to a belief that basic questions of right and obligation should be settled
by an appeal, not to the philosophical abstractions of natural law, but to a
concrete body of customary rights, remedies and procedures.
2 9 Id. at 298.
30 Ibid.
314 HoLDSWoRTHr, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 208 (1924).
32 MATLAND, op. cit. vipra note 23, at 298.
3 3 Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1607).
34 GOUGH, op. cit. mtpra note 10, at 34-43.
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In contrast to the English turmoil, the doctrine of sovereignty gained
wide currency and respectability on the continent during the sixteenth
century-a period in which the dominant condition of political life was the
emergence of powerful national monarchies from the ruins of the feudal
system. Jean Bodin, who published his De Republica in France in 1576,
defined the state in terms of sovereignty and subjection that discarded
traditional ideas of consent and limitation.35 The subject owed unques-
tioning obedience to the state, which Bodin defined as an association of
families and their common affairs, governed by a highest power, or sover-
eignty.36 Sovereignty was the highest power over citizens and subjects,
unrestrained by laws,37 and the essence of sovereignty was the power to give
law to all subjects, generally and singly.38 The sovereign was not bound by
past laws,39 nor was it necessary that he obtain the consent of his subjects
to his actions. 40 The only law to which he must conform related to the
constitutional basis of his sovereignty: he was subject to the law of princely
succession and he could not alienate the territory of the state.41 Bodin
conceded that the sovereign owed a moral duty to his subjects to conform
to the law of God and nature,42 but his work omits the problem inherent
in the choice between obedience to a command of the sovereign violative
of divine or natural law, and obedience to those admittedly higher laws.
43
His evasiveness reflects the basic dilemma of political thought of the time:
men were prone to insist on older beliefs that a ruler is subject to immutable
customary laws, while at the same time recognizing that there were no
35 See 4 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 31, at 193-96 for an excellent brief
summary of Bodin's theory of sovereignty.
36 "Un droit gouvernment de plusieurs mesnages, et de ce qui leur est commun,
avec puissance souberaine." 1 BODIN, DE LA RtPUBLIQUE ch. i, at 1 (1593), quoted
in 4 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 31, at 194 n.6.
37 "La souverainet6 n'est limitee, ny en puissance, ny en charge, 'ny i certain
tempes." Id. ch. viii, at 90, quoted in 4 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 31, at 195 n.1.
38 "Soubs cest m~me puissance de donner et casser la loy, sont compris tous les
autres droits et marques de souverainet6." Id. ch. x, at 163, quoted in 4 HoLDsworH,
op. cit. supra note 31, at 195 n.4.
39 "Si donc le Prince souverain, est exempt des loix de ses predecesseurs, beaucoup
moins seroit il tenu aux loix et ordonnances qu'il fait . . ." Id. ch. viii, at 96-97,
quoted in 4 HoLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 31, at 195 n.2.
4 o ALLEN, A HISTORY OF POLITIcAL THOUGHT IN THE SIXTEENTH CENrURY 413-14
(1928).
41 See the discussion, id. at 417-18 of Bodin's conception of the Salic Law of
succession and the law prohibiting alienation of domain as leges imperii, undefeasible
and binding upon the monarch.
42 "Quant aux loix divines et naturelles, tous les Princes de terre y sont subets,
et n'est pas en leur puissance d'y contre venir, s'ils ne veulent estre coupable de leze
majest6 divine, faisant guerre i Dieu." 1 BODIx, DE LA REPUBLIQUE ch. viii, at 97
(1593), quoted in 4 HOLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 31, at 195 n.7.
4 3 The inference may be drawn that the subject was bound at least not to engage
in active disobedience of a command of the sovereign which violated the "loix divines
et naturalles." The only sanction recognized by Bodin against the ruler for such a
violation of natural law was the divine punishment which a just God would surely
impose upon a Prince who should "make war" against Him. See 4 HOLDSWORTH,
op. cit. supra note 31, at 195.
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institutional devices capable of enforcing the sovereign's conformity to those
laws.
It is not surprising that Bodin was unable to account for the limited
English monarchy in terms of his conceptions of sovereignty and sub-
jection.'" However, Richard Hooker, an English contemporary of Bodin,
did explain and justify the monarchy of Elizabeth on the basis of a political
theory which likewise recognized the legislative capacity of the ruler and
the subject's duty of obedience.45 But Hooker dealt with authority and
obligation in terms of the familiar medieval conceptions of consent, the
supremacy of law, and the so-called "mixed constitution," roughly equiv-
alent to the do'ninium politicale et regale of Fortescue.46
Hooker's theory of law and politics derived directly from the Scholastic
tradition. A hierarchical order of the world-reflected in a ranking of
divine, natural and human law 47-was a basic part of Hooker's vision;
at the same time his acceptance of the traditional Christian notion of the law
of nature and reason was marked by a strong pragmatic and historical sense.
On the question of the evidence from which the law of nature may be
inferred, he followed the common lawyers in entertaining a strong presump-
tion in favor of that which has been traditionally practiced and accepted.48
However, he argued that all human laws derive from reason in the sense
that they are means addressed to an end; consequently the reason may be
justifiably employed to alter the law as circumstances change, the better to
44 "Les autres Roys font pas plus de puissance que ]a Roy d' Angleterre; par ce
qu'il n'est en la puissance de Prince du monde, de lever imposts a son plaisir sur le
peuple, nonplus que prendre le bien d'autruy." 1 BoDIX, op. cit. supra note 42, ch.
viii, at 102, quoted in 4 HOLDSWoRTH, op. cit. supra note 31, at 195 n.5. This is
scarcely consistent with his statement, made elsewhere, that "la souverainet6 donnee
un Prince soubs charges et conditions, n'est pas proprement souverainet6, ny puis-
sance absolue." Id. at 93, quoted in 4 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 31, at 195 n.1.
45 Although Hooker's book treats Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, the title
of the work conceals its broad scope. Written at a time when the study of politics
was still subsumed in large measure under the disciplines of theology and ethics, it
propounded questions of authority and obligation that are common to all "polities,"
whether civil or ecclesiastical, and answered them in a lucid, if somewhat anachronous,
restatement of the medieval doctrine of moral restraint of political power. As Holds-
worth has said, "Hooker's book is dominated by the medieval idea of the supremacy
of the law." 4 HoLDsWoRTH, op. cit. supra note 31, at 212. See generally D'ENTRPvs,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 88-142.
4 6 See text accompanying note 22 suipra.
47 HOOKER, OF THE LAWES OF ECcLESIASTICAL PoLrrim bk. 1, at 47 (1617) : "Thus
farre therefore we have endeuoured in part to open, of what nature and force Lawes
are, according vnto their seuerall kindes; the Law which God with him selfe hath
eternally set downe to follow in his owne workes; the Law which he hath made for
his creatures to keepe, the Law of naturall and necessary Agents; the Law which
Angels in heauen obey; the Law whereunto by the light of Reason men finde them-
selves bound in that they are men; the Law which they make by composition for
multitudes and politique Societies of men to be guided by; the Law which belongeth
vnto each Nation; the Law that concerneth the fellowship of all, and lastly, the Law
which God himselfe bath supernaturally reuealed."
4 8 HoKER, op. cit. supra note 47, bk. 4, at 135: "For in all right & equity, that
which the Church bath receiued and held so long for good, that which publike Appro-
bation bath ratified, must carrie the benefit of presumption with it to be accounted
meet & conuenient."
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attain the end desired.49  In this Hooker differed from the still persistent
medieval view of law as immutable custom to which the common lawyers
subscribed.50 Hooker's belief that the dictates of reason and nature should
be responsive to the changing needs of society without contradicting the
evidence afforded by historical development, reveals a "typically English
distrust of rational constructions and deep feeling for tradition . . . ,, 5'
Like Saint Germain, Hooker recognized that the law of nature and reason
is not necessarily abstract, but may be arrived at inductively from his-
torical data.
Hooker followed medieval tradition in assuming that the law of reason,
engraved on the hearts of mankind from creation, must be supplemented
by "human" or "positive" law authoritatively pronounced by a ruler in a
political society.52 Reflecting the Augustinian theory that political institu-
tions are enjoined by God as a consequence of and punishment for man's
fall from grace,5 3 Hooker evidently believed that human government derived
its immediate power from the community and its ultimate sanction from
God Himself:
"To take away all such mutuall grieuances, iiuries and wrongs, there
was no way but onely by growing vnto composition and agreement
amongst themselues, by ordaining some kind of Gouernment publike
and by yeelding themselues subject thereunto; that vnto whom they
granted authoritie to rule and gouerne, by them the peace, tranquillitie,
and happy estate of the rest might bee procured." 54
In England the "Gouernment publike" was the King-in-Parliament, and
its legislative capacity extended to all things which the law of God and of
nature "leaueth arbitrarie and at libertie." Such matters were "all subiect
to the positiue Lawes of men; which Lawes for the common benefit abridge
particular mens libertie in such things, as farre as the rules of equitie will
suffer. This we must either maintayne, or else ouer-turne the world, and
make euery man his owne Commander." 55 Although he recognized that
"the publike power of all societies is aboue euery soule contayned in the
same societies," and vigorously asserted the subject's duty of obedience to
that power, Hooker also maintained that the form of that "publike power"
49 HooxR, op. cit. supra note 47, bk. 1, at 44-47.
50 See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
51 D'ENTRAvES, op. cit. supra note 11, at 120-21.
52 Each society was free to adopt the "positive" laws and institutions that suited
its condition, so long as they were not contrary to the laws of God and nature.
HOOKER, op. cit. supra note 47, bk. 3, at 2-3.
53 "Laws Politike, ordained for exterhall Order and Regiment amongst men, are
neuer framed as they should be, vnlesse presuming the will of man to be inwardly
obstinate, rebellious, and auerse from all obedience vnto the Sacred Lawes of his
nature; in a word, vnlesse presuming man to be in regard of his depraued, little better
then a wild beast, they doe accordingly prouide, notwithstanding so to frame his
outward actions .. " HooKER, op, cit. supra note 47, bk. 1, at 25.
54 Id. at 26.
55 HooKER, op. cit. supra note 47, bk. 5, at 382.
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was a subject of the free choice of the particular group or "independent
multitude" which instituted it.56 His statement of the role of consent as
an institutional device in the English political structure suggests Fortescue's
distinction of a century earlier between the dominium regale and the
dominiumn politicale et regale:
"Where the king has power of dominium . . . there no foreign state,
or potentate, no state or potentate domestic, whether it consists of one
or many, can possibly have . . . authority higher than the king.
. . . On the other side; the king alone has no right to do without
consent of the lords and commons assembled in parliament: the king
of himself cannot change the nature of pleas, nor courts, no not so
much as restore [corrupted] blood; because the law is a bar unto
himl.") 57
Richard Hooker's organic Christian state bore limited resemblance to the
political actualities of late Elizabethan England. It presupposed what was
untrue in reality: the substantial agreement of the whole body politic,
motivated by the dictates of natural reason, as to the political and religious
ends which the commonwealth should pursue. Thus clinging to the ideal
of rational uniformity in a day when self-seeking diversity was rampant,
it was not the first nor the last political philosophy to attempt to accom-
modate the facts of one age to the assumptions of the era preceding it.
The claims of James I to unbridled legislative capacity and the vigorous
opposition that immediately developed to them dramatically underlined the
breakdown of the ideals expressed by Hooker in the face of rapid political
and economic flux. The early Stuart pretensions were soon supported by
argumentative literature supporting the "divine right of kings"; no small
part was contributed by James himself. Briefly stated, the position of the
supporters of James and Charles in the ensuing constitutional struggle was
that monarchy is a divinely ordained institution; the hereditary right of
succession thereto is indefeasible; the King, in whom sovereignty is entirely
and indivisibly vested, is answerable to God alone; God requires obedience
to the commands of the king that comport with God's law, and nonresistance
to the laws of the king that transgress it.
58
It is scarcely possible to overstate the assertions of the Stuart kings.
James I maintained that "kings were the authors and makers of the Lawes,
and not the Lawes of the kings." 59 In words that recall Bodin's statement
that the French monarch is bound by the Salic law of succession,60 James
recognized no fundamental laws save "onely those Lawes whereby con-
5 6 HooKER, OF THE LAWS op ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY bk. 8, ch. 2, § 5, in 3 RIcH-
ARD) HooKER's Wo xs 343 (6th ed. Keble 1874).
57 HooxER, op. cit. mipra note 56, bk. 8, ch. 2, §§ 2, 17, in 3 RICHARD HOOKER'S
WoRKs 343, 357 (6th ed. Keble 1874).
5 8 FIGGis, THE DmxnzE RIGHT OF KINGs 5-6 (1914).
59 THE POLITCAL WORKS OF JAMES I 62 (Mcllwain ed. 1918).
60 See note 41 .upra.
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fusion is avoyded, and their King's descent mainteined, and the heritage of
the succession and Monarchie . . . ." 61 Implicitly rejecting any notion
that sovereignty was vested in the King-in-Parliament, he claimed, for
instance, a right to deal with his subjects' lands "without advice or
authoritie of either Parliament, or any other subalterin iudiciall seate." 62
His obligations were not to the people or to their representatives, but to God
alone. Nevertheless, as McIlwain has stated, "in fairness to James himself,
it must be said that in theory if not always in practice, he emphasized these
duties only less than his powers." 63
James' emphasis upon his obligations as well as his powers reflects the
age in which he lived. It is significant that the developing theories of
sovereignty assumed almost unanimously that a state in which the sovereign
exercised his power unjustly was not truly well ordered. Bodin implied
that good order required more than the mere absence of disturbance.
Though the ruler was legibus solutus for practical purposes, he was morally
obliged to abstain from exercising his authority outside the bounds of
natural law.6 4 However, even systems of mixed or limited monarchy such
as England were notably deficient in institutional sanctions effective to
restrain a ruler's illegal exercise of power. The force of the Biblical
injunction of obedience to temporal rulers and the Augustinian notion of
government as a punishment for original sin, as well as patriotic devotion
to the person of the monarch, hampered the development of means by which
recognized theoretical limitations upon rulers might be enforced in practice.
Theorists who propounded systems of limited government typically assumed
a studied vagueness as to sanctions, or expressly admitted that the limita-
tions which they proposed were little more than guideposts for the ruler's
conscience. 65 The few exceptions, who advocated resistance to illegal acts
of the ruler or-more dramatically-tyrannicide as the ultimate sanction,
were universally condemned in England where awareness of the threat
of foreign subversion was never absent from the collective consciousness
in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
66
As a consequence, distinctions between theories of sovereignty and of
limitation were perhaps more apparent than real. In England under the
first James and Charles, Parliament's increasing resistance to Stuart ab-
solutism and signs of a developing theory of constitutional review in the
courts of the common law gave some promise of eventual attainment of
effective institutional checks upon royal power.67 Coke's rather ambiguous
61 JAMES I, op. cit. supra note 59, at 300. See, however, his views on the con-
tractual effect of the coronation oath. Id. at 309.
62 Id. at 195.
6
3 Id. at xliv (editor's introduction).
64 See text accompanying note 42 supra.
65 See generally ALLEN, op. Cit. supra note 40, at 247-70.
66 See Mcllwain's discussion of the controversial literature in JAMES I, op. ct.
supra note 59, at lvi-lxxx (editor's introduction).
67 See generally McILwAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREM-
ACY 371-74 (1910).
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intimations of the supremacy of the law-enforced through judicial review
of legislation-proved to be abortive in England, though this concept was to
be revived in American constitutional law. Nor did the struggle between
King and Parliament result in a balanced constitution, based on consent
and mutual obligation as projected by Fortescue and Hooker. Rather, its
ultimate result was a drastic displacement of sovereignty from the King
to Parliament during the Civil War and the Interregnum; to paraphrase
Father Figgis, the divine right of the Stuart kings gave way to the divine
right of Parliament.
68
FUNDAMENTAL LAW AND PURITANISM
The Law of God
The bitter pamphlet controversy between Anglican and Puritan
publicists, which gives a distinctive flavor to the intellectual history of the
reigns of Elizabeth and the first two Stuarts, has obscured the substantial
agreement of the opposing camps with respect to wide areas of politics and
religion. Like their opponents, the apologists for the English establishment
such as Hooker and Whitgift, the lay and clerical Puritan leaders were
heirs to the rich and varied intellectual tradition of the Renaissance and
Reformation. Apart from the concrete problems that it attacked and the
particular program that it advocated, English Puritanism "was part and
parcel of the times, and its culture was simply the culture of England at
that moment." 69 For example, the English university training received
by a number of the leaders of the emigration to Massachusetts was the same
as that of other English gentlemen, and the curriculum prescribed for
Harvard College closely followed that of Cambridge University in Eng-
land.70 At the same time, however, the Puritans were eclectic and
tendentious after the prevailing fashion; 71 as a consequence their applica-
tion of traditional doctrines exhibited a number of features and emphases
that were peculiar to Puritanism.
Pertinent examples of this tendency are apparent in Puritan notions
of the nature of law, of the relationships among divine, natural and human
law, and of the scope and content of each. Like their learned opponent
Richard Hooker, Puritan writers were accustomed to using the philosoph-
ical concepts of the Schoolmen, and they assumed the validity of the
hierarchical arrangement of laws-human, natural, and divine. The place
in this scheme of the word of God revealed in Holy Scripture had never
been clearly established by theologians. Since natural law as conceived by
the Classical world was a set of abstractions-unwritten rules with implicit
possibilities for disagreement in interpretation-it had been attacked by the
68 FIGGIS, op. cit. supra note 58, at 11.
69 MILLER & JOHNSON, THE PURITANS 7 (1938).
7o Id. at 19-21.
71 MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH CrNTURY 89 (1947).
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cynic and the sceptic as a wholly subjective system affording no basis for
moral guidance. Adopting the notion of natural law, the Church could
answer these arguments by adverting to the Bible as an authoritative text
embodying the principles of the natural law. Accordingly, a tendency to
equate the law of nature with Biblical revelation is discernible in the
writings of a number of pre-Reformation scholars; 72 more typically, how-
ever, medieval conceptions of natural law were couched in terms of general
principles drawn from human reason and experience rather than scriptural
specifics. 73  In the wake of the quickened interest in the Bible that ac-
companied the Reformation, protestant theologians, in contrast with their
Scholastic forebears, often referred to the law of nature as if it were
embodied in and exemplified by the injunctions of the Ten Commandments
and the teachings of Christ.
74
No protestant sect was more emphatic as to the literal identity of
revelation and natural law than the Puritans who emigrated to Massachu-
setts. Their ministers and magistrates subscribed to a belief not merely
that the moral principles of the Decalogue and the New Testament embodied
the law of nature, but that a large proportion of the specific rules of
Mosaic law was also exemplary of the natural law. This was so by virtue
of their evident or demonstrable conformity to right reason. The standard
applied to specific portions of the Mosaic law to determine their inclusion
in the natural law, and hence their applicability in Massachusetts, was at
once logical and pragmatic. The intricate "ceremonial law" of the books
of Moses, dealing with dietary rules and the manner of worship, was clearly
intended for the "particular condition" of the people of Israel; hence it
lacked the universal applicability that was a hallmark of natural law. On
the other hand, much of the "judicial" law of Moses, "which is about
judgments or any politic matters thereto belonging," was held to be equally
entitled to a place in the. law of nature with the "moral" laws of the Ten
Commandments and the teachings of Christ.75 The criterion, despite its
expression in terms of Schoolmen's logic, was essentially utilitarian. If a
law were to qualify as moral, it was necessary that the "special intrinsical
and proper reason of the law," as well as its general reason, be moral.78
The latter test may be said to have involved an appraisal of the end that was
contemplated by the law, whereas the former entailed an assessment of
the means in terms of the "special intrinsical and proper" condition of
72 E.g., Gratian, who first identified natural law with the Holy Scriptures; Rufinus
and the canonists later developed the notion of the Mosaic and Evangelic law as an
external substitute for the interior light of reason, clouded by original sin, and the
important distinction between the "moral" and "ceremonial" aspects of Biblical law.
See 1 LEWIS, MEDIAEVAL POITICAL IDEAS 9 (1954).
73 1 LEWIS, op. cit. supra note 72, at 7-17.
74 McNeill, Natural Law it; the Teaching of the Reformers, 26 J. RELIGION 168
(1946).
75 AmEs, CONscIENcE WITH THE POWER AND CASES THEREOF (1639), reprinted
in part in PURITANISM AND LIBERTY 187, 191-92 (Woodhouse ed. 1951).
76 Id. at 191.
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the society in which its application was contemplated. The prefatory
epistle to the Massachusetts Code of 1648 remarked that "so soon as God
had set up Politicall Government among his people Israel hee gave them a
body of lawes for judgement both in civil and criminal causes. These were
breif and fundamental principles, yet withall so full and comprehensive
as out of them clear deductions were to be drawne to all particular cases in
future times." 77 The passage refers to the divine promulgation of the
"judicial" laws of Moses and exemplifies the conception of a division of
divine law into "natural" and "positive" aspects. 78  The judicial laws of
Moses were an emanation of God's positive law, conceived to be "mutable
and various according to God's good pleasure," 79 so that the reference to
"clear deductions" applicable to future particular cases does not imply that
the judicial laws and the deductions therefrom were necessarily applicable
in Massachusetts. Rather the author of the epistle appears to have meant
only that God's "people Israel" might properly deduce rules for particular
cases from the "breif and fundamental principles" revealed to them.
Whether the colonists of Massachusetts should adopt any particular part
of the divine positive law given to Moses' Israel was a question which called
for rational analysis, not blind obedience; the answer properly took account
of matters of policy and expediency subsumed under the rubric of the
"special intrinsical and proper reason of the law." 80
Puritan legal theory was marked by simplicity of form, but its applica-
tion to specific social and political situations demanded a considerable
degree of sophistication. This is equally true with respect to Puritan views
as to legislative capacity. Belief in the identity of natural law with scrip-
turally revealed law led Puritan writers to lay particular stress upon the
idea that God was the sole lawmaker; at best, human enactments could only
reflect or restate the divine principles revealed in the Bible. Decidedly,
such enactments did not derive their dignity as "law" from the will of the
human authority from which they proximately emanated. William Aspin-
wall remarked in his preface to John Cotton's draft code that:
"Though the Author attribute the word [Law] unto some of them; yet
that it was not his meaning that they should be enacted as Lawes (if
you take the word Law in a proper sense) appears by his conclusion
taken out of Isa. 33.22. lee knew full well that it would be an
intrenchment upon the Royall power of Jesus Christ, for them or any
other of the sonnes of Adam to ordain Lawes. . . For alas, what
energie or vertue can such an act of poore sinfull creatures adde unto
the most perfect and wholsome lawes of God?" 8 1
77 
THE Boox OF THE GENERAL LATUES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABI-
TANTS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS (1648) (introductory epistle).
78 AMES, op. cit. supra note 75, reprinted in part in PURITANISM AND LIBERTY
187, 188 (Woodhouse ed. 1951).
79 Id. at 187.
80 See HAsKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 161-62 (1960).
81 1 HUTCHINSON PAPERS 182 (Prince Soc'y ed. 1865).
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Cotton himself asserted that "the more any Law smells of man the more
unprofitable"; 82 nevertheless Puritan logic was equal to the task of ac-
commodating such laws to the theory that God is the only law-giver. The
conclusion of the epistle to the 1648 Massachusetts Code warns against
the danger of rash discrimination between the laws of God and the laws
of men, for
"when the Authoritie is of God and that in way of an Ordinance
Rom. 13.1. and when the administration of it is according to deduc-
tions, and rules gathered from the word of God, and the clear light
of nature in civil nations, surely there is no humane law that tendeth to
common good (according to those principles) but the same is medi-
ately a law of God, and that in way of an Ordinance which all are to
submit unto and that for conscience sake. Rom. 13.5." 83
The Puritan test of the "morality" of scriptural law in terms of its
suitability to the particular needs of the community suggests both the
English lawyers' justification of the common law as custom which has
proved its conformity to reason and Richard Hooker's argument for the
mutability of laws.8 4 All three views posited unchangeable principles which
underlay their particular, positive manifestations: for the Puritan theorist
such a principle might be found in the judicial law of Moses which served
as the model for a positive human enactment; for the lawyer it would
ordinarily be found in a common-law rule which was judicially applied to a
particular controversy; and for Hooker the principle was discoverable by
the application of right reason to a problem confronting the "publike
power." Although Hooker stresses the mutability of positive laws more
specifically than does either the Puritan or the common lawyer, a central
purpose to reconcile the abstract law of nature and the concrete needs of
human society is apparent in the other two theories. The Puritan's task
involved an attempt "to harmonize the determination of God with the ex-
ertion of men, the edicts of revelation with the counsels of reason and
experience." 85 The interrelation of these two factors in Puritan legal
thought is readily apparent in the prefatory epistle to the Massachusetts
Code of 1648.86 The operation of the English common law was similar:
grounded upon the myth of law in rules whose reasonableness was proved
by immemorial usage, it was implemented in practice by sophisticated
judicial choices that were largely independent of natural reason.
Thus when James I sought to justify an asserted right to judge legal
causes on the basis of his ability as a reasonable man to apply correctly a
82 Ford, Cotton's "Moses his .udicials", 16 PROCEEDINGS OF MASS. HIsT. Soc'y
274, 284 (2d ser. 1893).
83 GENERAL LAUUES AND LIBERTYES, op. cit. supra note 77 (introductory epistle).
84 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
85 MILLER & JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note 69, at 191.
86 See text accompanying note 83 supra.
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law purportedly grounded upon universal principles of reason, he received
a famous rebuke from Sir Edward Coke, his Lord Chief Justice. Coke
instructed James "with all reverence" that, though the King was a rea-
sonable man, he was not "learned in the laws of this your realm of
England," and that legal causes were "not to be decided by natural reason,
but by the artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an art which
requires long study and experience before that a man can attain to the
cognizance of it." 87 Coke's position as to the common law was not unlike
the orthodox Puritan view that definition of the law of God and its applica-
tion to human society must be entrusted to learned and godly ministers
and magistrates; both assumed that unassisted "natural" reason was in-
capable of arriving at a proper legal formulation of principles which in
theory were discoverable by rational processes. The logical inconsistency
that appears to be inherent in this view may be explained by the common
lawyer's conception of the law as a craft or "mystery." The apparent in-
consistency of the Puritan concept merely reflected the theological dogma
that the natural reason of man instilled by God at the Creation had been
clouded, though not entirely effaced, by the derangement of human faculties
that followed man's fall from grace.
The literal Biblicism of the Massachusetts Puritans was strikingly
expressed in a number of positive laws of the colony which resulted in
substantial departures from contemporary English law.88 And even in the
absence of an appropriate provision of enacted law, the scripturally revealed
natural law contemplated by Puritan theory was nevertheless applicable.8 9
So long as the colony's positive legislation was relatively sparse, the magis-
trates-as the guardians and interpreters of the underlying unwritten law-
exercised discretionary powers that far exceeded those of an English
common-law judge. It is not surprising that those powers excited suspicion
among many colonists whose memories of arbitrary government in England
were still fresh. The codification movement-the popular response to the
threat believed posed by magisterial discretion 9 -- was illustrative of still
another aspect of the Puritan mentality, not unrelated to its Biblical
literalism. The Puritans' reliance upon the Bible as a source of law was
only the most vivid manifestation of a general yearning for the certainty
that was thought to inhere in the written word. Puritan hostility to the
English courts of law, for instance, appears to have been based in con-
siderable part upon distrust of the unwritten law there enforced. The dis-
cretionary powers of Equity and the prerogative courts of Star Chamber
and High Commission-unlimited even by the vague precedents of the un-
written common law-were objects of particular attack by Puritan writers.
87 1 CAMPBELL, THE LIVEs OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 279 (1873).
88 See generally HASKINS, op. cit. sipra note 80, at 145-57.
89 1 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN
NEW ENGLAND 175 (Shurtleff ed. 1853).
90 On the movement for codification, see generally HASKINS, op. cit. supra note
80, at 119-40.
1018 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.108:1001
A recurring theme in their controversial literature was the necessity of
reducing the chaotic corpus of English law to a collection of written rules
conformable to the dictates of God as revealed in Holy Scripture.91
Moreover, through their experiences in the manors and boroughs of
England, many of the colonists had become used to the notion of precise
limitation of authority by written custumals and bylaws authoritatively
expressing the rights and responsibilities of all members of the community.
92
On a more exalted level, Parliament's exaction of written guarantees of its
rights from Charles I was a matter of recent history,9 3 and a belief in the
special position of the Magna Charta as a species of statutory fundamental
law had gained wide currency during the struggle against the prerogative
powers of the Crown.94 So long as they remained in England, the delicate
position of the Puritans with respect to the Church and the Crown virtually
forced them to take the position that all powers of government are limited;
these attitudes were not readily discarded when the colonists found them-
selves aggrieved by what they regarded as arbitrary conduct by the leaders
of a Puritan commonwealth. These general cultural and political influences,
coupled with the peculiar Puritan stress upon the value of precise written




Puritan notions of the nature and sources of law were supplemented
and reinforced by the peculiar form of the colonists' belief in the con-
sensual origin of human government and by their adherence to the idea of
the organic nature of society and the state. These aspects of Puritan social
and political theory received their principal expressions in the "social
covenant," which accompanied and derived from the "covenant of grace,"
and in the "church covenant." Like the theory of the divine right of kings,
the notion of the covenant as developed and applied by the Massachusetts
colonists was the product of "an age in which not only religion but theology
and politics were inextricably mingled-when even for utilitarian senti-
ments a religious basis must be found if they were to obtain acceptance." 9 6
As was true of other fundamental concepts of Puritanism, the virtue of the




92 Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England,
31 COLUm. L. REv. 416, 430-34 (1931).
9 3 MCILVAIN, op. cit. supra note 67, at 82.
94 Pococic, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEuDAL LAwv 44-45 (1957).
95 See note 90 .mpra and accompanying text.
96 FIGGis, op. cit. supra note 58, at 11.
9 7 An eminent historian of Puritan thought has observed that the social covenant
"may be engineered by God, but it is also an eminently reasonable way of bringing
a state into being." MImLER & JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note 69, at 191.
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According to the "federal" version of Puritanism to which the Massa-
chusetts colonists subscribed, God had always dealt with man by means
of covenant. The original covenant, offered to Adam, was the so-called
"covenant of works," in which the consideration for a divine promise of
eternal life was man's strict obedience to God's positive law. The oppor-
tunity to earn salvation through "works" or moral obedience was lost to
Adam and his posterity because of his sin of disobedience--"In Adam's
Fall/We sinned all," commences a seventeenth century catechism for
Massachusetts children.98 Repudiation of the covenant of works was
followed eventually by a totally new covenant which God mercifully offered
to Abraham; under this "covenant of grace" the prerequisite of human
salvation was not works but faith. It originated in an offer, freely made by
God and open to acceptance by any individual, in which God engaged to
"convey all that concerns our happiness, upon our receiving of them, by
believing on him." There was no other road to salvation: "God conveys
his salvation by way of covenant, and he doth it to those onely that are in
covenant with him. . . . This covenant must every soule enter into, every
particular soul must enter into a particular covenant with God; out of this
way there is no life." 9 9 The covenant of grace afforded a means by which,
even in man's fallen state, the impotence of the human will and the
omnipotence of the divine could deal on terms of equality. Because God
initiated the transaction of His own merciful volition, His offer of the
covenant to man did not detract from His omnipotence. Man, on the other
hand, could bind Him to His offer by acceptance; by "believing on him,"
man's puny will could confine the exercise of the illimitable divine power
to the express terms of the covenant.'0 0
This conception, however, suggested a question, the answer to which
was crucially important not merely to religion but to human society in its
broader aspects: if faith alone was sufficient for salvation, what need was
there for moral obedience to the standards of behavior imposed by the
Bible and enforced in one degree or another by every Christian society? In
reply, the covenant theologians propounded that the covenant of grace
incorporated the covenant of works. To be sure, conformance to the cove-
nant of works was not regarded as a condition of the covenant of grace;
fallen man, contaminated and morally disabled by original sin, was incapable
of fulfilling his obligations under the older covenant. But Christ had ful-
filled the covenant of works and satisfied God's vengeance; his righteous-
ness was imputed to the saints among mankind for their salvation. This
imputation of His virtue to man's credit-evocable by man through faith-
was known as "justification." "I The categorical law of the original
98 Quoted in id. at 696.
9 MILLER, op. cit. mpra note 71, at 374 (quoting an unidentified seventeenth
century writer).
100 See generally id. at 373-78.
101 Id. at 383-85.
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covenant, full compliance with which was admittedly impossible to man in
his fallen state, nevertheless remained "as the unchangeable rule of life
and manners, according to which persons in Covenant ought to walke
before and with the Lorde, and in this sense it belongs to the Covenant of
Grace." This was so because "for the Morall Law, the Law of the ten
Commandements, we are dead . . . to the covenant of that law, though
not to the command of it." 102
If a man attained grace through covenant with God, he owed a duty
to make use of it to follow God's commandments; it was assumed that a
reborn man, in the moment of his justification through faith, was imbued
with heightened ability to follow the path of righteousness indicated by
God's laws. His righteous conduct after justification was known as
"sanctification"-entirely a function of his own will and faculties as re-
generated through grace. Supine faith alone was theoretically sufficient
to satisfy the terms of the covenant of grace, but an active striving toward
righteous behavior was expected of the regenerate man and was regarded
as the best evidence of spiritual revival. Though "workes are not set as the
causes of our salvation," nevertheless they were "evidences and signes of
those that do believe unto life." 103
The Puritans were thoroughly familiar with the Augustinian view that
human government was ordained by God as a consequence of man's fall
from grace. Uncorrupted by original sin, men might safely omit laws and
governments, inasmuch as each man's free compliance with the moral
dictates of the natural law engraved upon the human heart at Creation
would insure order and justice among men. 0 4 But fallen man's un-
restrained natural liberty "is a liberty to evil as well as to good," in John
Winthrop's words, and the "exercise and maintaining of this liberty makes
men grow more evil, and in time to be worse than brute beasts. . ," 105
In order that men might live in some semblance of peace with one another,
God ordained that they should be subject to organized society. Reinforc-
ing the notion that the necessity for human government arose from original
sin was the belief that man is inclined by his nature toward political asso-
ciation.1 6 Human government was thus a fact of nature, but it was also
divinely ordained; a Massachusetts election sermon asserted that "power of
Civil Rule, by men orderly chosen, is God's Ordinance" though "'it is from
1 02 Id. at 191 (quoting John Cotton).
' 0 3 Id. at 392 (quoting an unidentified seventeenth century writer).
' 04 In the words of an election sermon of the seventeenth century, "had man kept
his first state, the Moral Image Concreated in him, consisting in Knowledg, Right-
eountess, and True Holiness, would have maintained him in a perfect understanding
of, and Spontaneous Obedience to the whole duty incumbent on him, without the need
of civil Laws to direct him, or a civil Sword to lay compulsion on him." Willard,
The Character of a Good Ruler, in MILLER & JOHNSON, op. Cit. supra note 69, at 251.
105 Winthrop, Speech to the General Court, July 3, 1645, in MILLER & JOHNSO,
op. cit. supra note 69, at 206.
106 See, e.g., the discussion of St. Thomas Aquinas' Conmnentary on the Politics,
lib. I, lectio i, in D'ENTRavs, THE MEDIEVAL CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL THOUGHT
25-26 (1939).
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the Light and Law of Nature,' because 'the Law of Nature is God's
Law.' "107
A regenerate man was expected to abide by God's laws and to fulfill
God's revealed will in church and society as well as in his private life.'08
Each of the congregations of the Massachusetts Bay Colony had its in-
ception in a formal mutual engagement defining the obligations of the mem-
bers; this was the church covenant, to which persons admitted to member-
ship were required to subscribe.109 Just as regenerate men gathered
themselves into churches by means of mutual covenant, so were they also
impelled to form and submit themselves to civil government. The seven-
teenth century mind could not conceive of the one without the other; there
must be a "due forme of Government both ciuill and ecclesiasticall." 110
In Massachusetts a "social covenant" between ruler and ruled, in the form
of the free annual election of the magistrates and deputies by the regenerate,
on the one side, and the solemn oaths of the persons elected promising
justice, on the other, was the immediate basis of the power of the govern-
ment. John Winthrop flatly stated that "no common weale can be founded
but by free consent"; "1 Thomas Hooker, the Massachusetts clergyman
who founded the colony of Connecticut, argued that in the formation of a
society among men "there must of necessity be a mutuall ingagement, each
of the other, by their free consent, before by any rule of God they have any
right or power, or can exercise either, each towards the other." 112
Although the selection of rulers was committed to the persons ruled,
Puritan theory placed the ultimate source of governmental power not in
the electors but in God, Who had ordained that men should be subject to
human laws and government and Who was deemed to be a party to the
social covenant itself. The election was in the nature of a secondary cause;
the will of God was manifested through the collective agency of His
regenerate people: "in regular actings of the creature, God is the first
Agent; there are not two several and distinct actings, one of God, another
of the People: but in one and the same action, God, by the Peoples suffrages,
makes such an one Governour, or Magistrate, and not another." 113
107 Davenport, A Sermon Preach'd at the Election . . . May 19th 1669, quoted
in MILLER & JoHNsoN, op. cit. supra note 69, at 191.
108 "The holy society was erected upon the belief that the right sort of men could
of their own free will and choice carry through the creation and administration of
the right sort of community. . . . The saints were expected to act positively because
they had in them a spirit of God that made them capable of every exertion." MILLER
& JO HNSOx, op. cit. mipra note 69, at 188.
109 HAsKINs, op. cit. .mpra note 80, at 85-87.
110 Winthrop, A Modell of Christian Society, in MILLER & JOHNSON, op. cit. mupra
note 69, at 197.
"'. Winthrop, A Defence of an Order Made in the Year 1637, in MILLER & JOaN-
SoN, op. cit. supra note 69, at 200.
112 Hooker, A Survey of the Summe of Church-Discipline, quoted in MILLER &
JoHxSON, op. cit. supra note 69, at 188.
113 Davenport, supra note 107, quoted, in MILLER & JOHNSOx, op. cit. opra note
69, at 190.
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Having attained grace through a covenant with God, the individual
was expected to bend his every effort toward fulfillment of "the Morall
law"; similarly, regenerate men gathered with God's approbation into both
churches and civil society owed a duty to see that God's law was followed
by sanctified and reprobate alike. Although unable to subscribe to the
social covenant through the annual election because of their exclusion from
a franchise restricted to church members, the latter sealed it implicitly by
living in the commonwealth and enjoying benefits in it, and explicitly by the
oath of obedience required of them. 14
The Covenant and Legislation
Apart from their belief that the origin and justification of church
and state lay in the covenant, the Massachusetts Puritans also applied the
notion of consent through covenant to their thinking about law and legis-
lation. Although the Puritans believed that the acts of "poore sinfull
creatures" could add no "energie or vertue . . . unto the most perfect
and wholsome lawes of God," 11 the instinctive feeling for the practical
that was coupled with their absorption in the doctrinal led them to recog-
nize that even the laws of God required the knowledge and consent of the
subject if they were to be the occasions of drastic sanctions in civil society.
The thinking and policy of the colonists in this regard was markedly
legalistic. Nothing could have been a clearer contravention of the law of
God than the act of adultery. Yet uncertainty regarding the procedural
sufficiency of the enactment and publication of a colonial adultery statute
saved three persons from the penalty of death prescribed therein. The
convicted adulterers were held in prison for several months while the
Massachusetts clergy were polled as to the propriety of putting them to
death. The answer of the elders concluded that if the colonial law "had
been sufficiently published, they ought to be put to death." Winthrop
noted in his journal, however, that:
"the court, considering that there had been some defect in that point,
and especially for that it had been oft questioned among the deputies
and others, whether that law were of force or not, being made by the
court of assistants by allowance of the general court; therefore it
was thought safest, that these three persons should be whipped and
banished; and the law was confirmed and published." 116
Winthrop later expressed his agreement with the necessity of notice as a
condition precedent to the exaction of punishment for violation of criminal
enactments, stating that he had "ever held it vniust, to require of men the
114 For the forms of the oaths required of freemen and inhabitants, see GENERAL
LAUUES AND LiaFRTyzs, op. cit. supra note 77, at 56.
115 See note 81 mpra and accompanying text.
116 1 WINTHROP, THE HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND FROM 1630 To 1649, at 257
(Savage ed. 1825).
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obedience to any Lawe, which they may not (by common Intendment) take
notice of." 117
William Aspinwall suggested that the laws of God, embodied in a
code of legislative specifics such as was favored by heavy popular pressure
in the colony during the 1630's and 1640's, became binding upon men in
civil society through a species of covenant resulting from the submission
of the laws to the people for their approbation and emendation.118 Such
an encovenanting process was followed by the General Court in the drafting
and eventual adoption of both the Body of Liberties of 1641 and the Massa-
chusetts Code of 1648.119 The extraordinary method employed in the draft-
ing and enactment of those two bodies of law may be explained by their
fundamental nature, as contrasted to ordinary, piecemeal legislation passed
by the General Court. The binding effect of the codes derived from a
covenant similar in some respects to the general social covenant annually
renewed in the colony's general elections, but distinguishable from the con-
sent to routine legislation implied by the participation of the freemen,
through the deputies, in the routine enactments of the General Court.
The Social Organism
Despite its voluntaristic origins, the commonwealth envisaged by
Puritan political thought was no mere congeries of its component groups
and individuals. On the contrary, it was ordinarily conceived of in organic
terms. John Winthrop instinctively illustrated the ideal toward which the
emigrants should strive in their public affairs by analogy to a living
organism:
".. . wee must be knitt together in this worke as one man, wee must
entertaine each other in brotherly Affection, wee must be willing to
abridge our selues of our superfluities, for the supply of others neces-
sities, wee must uphold a familiar Commerce together in all meekenes,
gentlenes, patience and liberallity, wee must delight in eache other,
make others condicions our owne reioyce together, mourne together,
labour, and suffer together, allwayes haueing before our eyes our Com-
mission and Community in the worke, our Community as members
of the same body.. ., 120
The forces within the colony pressing for limitation of governmental power
through the certainty of written laws and the definition of individual rights
also subscribed to the organic ideal. The prefatory epistle to the 1648
Massachusetts Code, a code enacted largely in response to popular demands
1 1 7
WINTHROP, Discourse on Arbitrary Government, in 4 WINTHROP PAPERs 487
(Mass. Historical Socdy 1944).
118 1 HUTCHINSON PAPERS, op. cit. mpra note 81, at 182.
119 See generally HAsKINS, op. cit. supra note 80, at 124-36.
120 Winthrop, supra note 110, at 198.
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for certainty in the law, echoed Winthrop's view of the organic nature of
colonial society:
"If any of you meet with some law that seems not to tend to your
particular benefit, you must consider that lawes are made with respect
to the whole people, and not to each particular person: and obedience
to them must be yielded with respect to the common welfare, not
to thy private advantage, and as thou yieldest obedience to the law
for the common good, but to thy disadvantage: so another must
observe some other law for thy good, though to his own damage; thus
must we be content to bear one anothers burden and so fulfill the Law
of Christ." 121
The medieval ideal of the commonwealth as an organic body-timeless, self-
sufficient, and subject by the consent of its members to a government
divinely empowered to pronounce laws for the common good-was never
more lucidly stated than in the foregoing passage. If the substantive legal
provisions which followed that passage encouraged individualistic ten-
dencies which would ultimately supplant the organic ideal, the inconsistency
was typical of an age when men sought to express new ideas in traditional
terms. More particularly it reflects the essentially contradictory deductions
that could be made from the basic assumptions of Puritanism.
THE INFLUENCE OF WINTHROP
Law and "Historical" Custom
The public acts and policies of John Winthrop, and the statements he
was repeatedly impelled to make in defense of them, demonstrate the re-
sourcefulness with which an astute political leader could use basic Puritan
ideas to define the goals of a struggling new society and to devise means
proper for their attainment. A brief reference in Winthrop's journal illus-
trates his skill in applying a familiar legal idea to the unique problems
presented by the attempt to erect a godly commonwealth within the terms
of a restrictive royal charter. Weighing the advisability of enacting a com-
prehensive body of laws for the colony, Winthrop recited the "reasons
. . . which caused most of the magistrates and some of the elders not to
be very forward in this matter." The first was "want of sufficient experi-
ence of the nature and disposition of the people, considered with the condi-
tion of the country and other circumstances, which made them conceive,
that such laws would be fittest for us, which should arise pro re nata upon
occasions, &c." "[A] nd so," he continued in a statement suggesting the
common lawyer's relation of custom to law, "the laws of England and
other states grew, and therefore the fundamental laws of England are called
customs, consuetudines." 122 However, Winthrop's position differed in
121 GENERAL LAUUES AND LIBERTYES, op. cit. .supra note 77 (introductory epistle).
122 1 WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 116, at 323.
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important respects from the accepted English view of common-law custom
as immemorial and thus anterior to history itself.123 The "custom" to
which Winthrop referred, in an isolated community founded less than ten
years before, was necessarily historical. More pointedly, Winthrop sug-
gested that "custom" might be deliberately instituted by authority. Recog-
nizing that positive enactment of many Puritan tenets, such as the civil
marriage, "would professedly transgress the limits of our charter, which
provide, we shall make no laws repugnant to the laws of England ... .
he nevertheless asserted that:
"to raise up laws by practice and custom had been no transgression;
as in our church discipline, and in matters of marriage, to make a law
that marriages should not be solemnized by ministers, is repugnant to
the laws of England; but to bring it to a custom by practice for the
magistrates to perform it is no law made repugnant, &c." 24
Winthrop's argument that "to raise up laws by practice and custom
had been no transgression" of the charter's terms may be viewed as a
specific application of the broad common-law assumption-implemented by
the myth of immemorial custom-of the conformity of customary rules
and practices to the law of reason. Winthrop, precluded from speaking
of colonial legal development in terms of custom that was timeless, simply
ignored that difficulty in his bold suggestion of a deliberate, authoritative
institution of "custom" which might serve as the basis of divergent colonial
law. The equation of law and reason was available, moreover, as a jus-
tification of departures of positive colonial enactments from the standard
prescribed by the charter. Thus, when the so-called "Child Petitioners" 125
asserted that a number of colonial laws were violative of the charter terms,
the General Court, with Winthrop presiding as Governor, replied that the
colony made no laws "repugnant" to the laws of England, inasmuch as
such laws would necessarily be "contrary to the law of God and of right
reason, which the learned in those laws [i.e., the laws of England] have
anciently and still do hold forth as the fundamental basis of their laws.
126 Moreover, noted the Court, "the learned in those laws" took
the position "that if any thing hath been otherwise established, it was an
errour, and not a law, being against the intent of the law-makers, however
it may bear the form of a law (in regard of the stamp of authority set
upon it) until it be revoked." 127 This latter assertion of the Court appears
to refer to an accepted English doctrine of statutory construction, which
123 See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
124 1 WINTHROP, op. cit. mipra note 116, at 323. (Emphasis added.)
125 On the "Child Petitioners," see generally Kittredge, Dr. Robert Child the
Remonstrant, in 21 PUBLICATIONS OF COLONIAL Soc'Y OF MASS. 1 (1919) ; MORISON,
BUILDERS OF THE BAY COLONY 244-68 (1930).
126 2 WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 116, at 289.
127 Ibid.
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assumed the legislators act in conformity with right reason and cannot
intend legislation that runs contrary thereto.123
Magisterial Discretion
Among the earliest legislative acts of the General Court of Massa-
chusetts was a declaration that the law of God should govern in any case
not covered by an express order of the Court 12R-a principle that was
reiterated in the Body of Liberties of 1641 130 and in the Code of 1648.131
However, despite general agreement that the Bible afforded all the
rules and principles necessary for the ordering of the church and civil
society, differences of opinion developed with regard to the proper means
for their implementation. In 1644, the deputies of the General Court pro-
pounded a number of questions to the elders of the churches concerning
scriptural justification of the discretion of the magistrates in matters of
criminal punishment. The Reply of the Elders to the questions put to
them by the deputies adopted the view that the legislators could "war-
rantably prescribe penalties to offences which may probably admit of
variable degrees of guilt."'83 2 The terms of the statute itself, in the elders'
view, should take account of the circumstances which might call for a
greater or lesser penalty for generically similar offenses,13 3 and the statute
might also properly provide for a range of penalties according to the cir-
cumstances of the offender, "as whether it were his first offence, or cus-
tomarie, whether he was inticed thereto or the inticer, whether he was
principall or accessary, whether unadvised or wittingly and willingly,
&c." 13 4  Moreover, a judge ought not to exceed the prescribed penalty,
"because he hath noe power committed to him by law to goe higher";
but if the prescribed penalty appeared to the judge to exceed the merit of
the offense, he should suspend the sentence "till by conference with the law-
givers he hath liberty, either to inflict the sentence or to mitigate it." 135
Stewardship
John Winthrop's Discourse on Arbitrary Government, written in
1644, was occasioned by the same general debate concerning magisterial
discretion that gave rise to the Reply of the Elders but reaches conclu-
sions fundamentally different from the stand taken by the deputies, whose
advocacy of criminal penalties rigidly prescribed by statute was substan-
128 A DIscOuRsE UPON THE ExPosIclON & UNDERSTANDINGE OF STATUTES 80-83
(Thorne ed. 1942) (editor's introduction).
129 1 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR, op. cit. supra note 89, at 175.
130 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUsETTS 33 (Whitmore ed. 1889).
131 GENERAL LAUUES AND LIBERT'yEs, op. cit. supra note 77 (introductory epistle).
132 1 HuTcHINSON PAPERs 209 (Prince Soc'y ed. 1865).
133 Id. at 210.
134 Ibid.
135 Id. at 211.
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tially supported by the Reply. Winthrop agreed that a just penalty must
be "by a certaine Rule," but he equated that "Rule" with "an ordinance
sett vp of God for that purpose," 136 which in his view was not necessarily,
or even usually, in the form of rigidly prescribed penalties. Rather it was
"a sure promise of divine assistance" to the judges in punishing each
wrongdoer according to the merit of his offense.137 God had prescribed
no penalties in the Bible "except Capitall, [or] . . . in suche Cases as
are betweene party and party, and that is rather in a waye of satisfaction
to the partye wronged, then to Justice and intention." 18 Winthrop was
confident that God would "teach his ministers the Judges, what sentence
to pronounce, if they will also observe his worde, and trust in him." 139
God had promised that He would guide the magistrates in their judg-
ments; Winthrop noted somewhat contemptuously that "no suche promise
was ever made to a paper Sentence of humane Aut[horit]ye or Inven-
tion." 140 The magistrate's function, then, was "to give a Just Sen-
tence";141 the principal guide to that end was the Bible, "with all the
Additions, explanations and deductions, which have followed" 142 since the
days when the laws of the Pentateuch served as the civil law of Israel.
More important, however, was God's promise of immediate assistance to
his judges in their disposition of cases pro re nata: "to be present in his
owne Ordinance, to improue suche gifts as he should please to conferre
vpon suche as he should call to place of Gouernment." 143 This aspect of
Winthrop's conception of the function and powers of the magistrate, en-
visioning the godly judge and ruler in terms of a stewardship of divinely
instilled "gifts," runs like a thread through his acts and utterances.
"Justice and Mercy"
Even though his writings are studded with Biblical citations, scrip-
tural literalism influenced Winthrop less than other leaders of the colony.
The Christian tradition which stressed the spirit of the New Testament
rather than the letter of the Old appears to have taken strong root in
Winthrop. In simplest form this doctrine held that Christ's new dispen-
sation freed men from bondage to the law of Moses; its roots were in
Paul's warning to the Galatians that "if righteousness come by the Law,
then Christ died in vain." ' 44 Winthrop, who once said that "the matter
136 WINTHROP, supra note 117, at 475.
137 Ibid.
138 Id. at 477.
139 Id. at 475.
140 Ibid.
141 Id. at 477.
142 Id. at 473.
143 Ibid.
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PUITANISM AND LIBERTY 65 (Woodhouse ed. 1951) (editor's introduction).
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of scripture . . . be always a Rule to vs, yet not the phrase," 145 appears
to have looked to the teachings of the New Testament as a liberating force.
His application of them, together with his conception of the stewardship
of the magistrate, left a distinctive mark on the colony's political and
legal development.
"There are two rules whereby wee are to walke one towards another:
JUSTIcE and MERcY," Winthrop told the Puritan emigrants aboard the
Arbella; "there is likewise a double Lawe by which wee are regulated in
our conversacion one towardes another: . . . the lawe of nature and the
lawe of grace, or the morrall lawe or the lawe of the gospell. . ," 146
John Milton and Martin Luther read the Pauline text as a total abrogation
of Mosaic law; 147 Winthrop, faithfully echoing a theology that postulated
the incorporation of the covenant of works into the covenant of grace, did
not go so far, but concluded that the justice which characterized the natural
or moral law propounded by Moses and the mercy which infused the
law of grace propounded in the Gospel supplemented one another as a
"double Lawe" by which godly men should be regulated.
In his essay, Arbitrary Government, Winthrop carried the notion
of a double law over from theology to jurisprudence even more em-
phatically, insisting upon the magistrate's duty to exercise "the wisdome
and mercye of God (which are his Attributes), as well as his Justice," 148
and demonstrating by an abundance of Scriptural examples that even the
penalties prescribed by God might be modified by force of overriding
circumstances. 149 The law of grace and mercy propounded in the New
Testament did not abrogate the moral law of the Old, but the new dis-
pensation mitigated and modified the old in the sense that it enjoined
the magistrate to look beyond the letter of the law to its end or reason.
The Equity of the Statute
Aside from religious justification there was basis in common-law
rules of statutory construction for Winthrop's position that the magistrate
should look to the "matter of Scripture" in preference to "the phrase."
By the sixteenth century the conception known in the law French of the
Year Books as l'equity de l'estatut had been supplemented in statutory
interpretation by a broader conception, which Plowden called an "equity
which is not part of the law, but a moral virtue which reforms the law." 150
Because, from the standpoint of these early equitable concepts, "the reason
of the lawe is the soule & pythe of the lawe, yea, the verie lawe itselfe,"
145 WINTHROP, John Winthrop to , in 4 WINTHROP PAPERS 347
(Mass. Historical Soc'y 1944).
146 Winthrop, mipra note 110, at 196.
1
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PURITANISM AND LIBERTY, op. cit. supra note 144, at 65.
14SWINTHROP, supra note 117, at 476.
149 Id. at 476-77.
150 Quoted in A DISCOURSE, op. cit. supra note 128, at 79 (editor's introduction).
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the ratio of the statute-in Winthrop's terms, the "matter of Scripture"--
was the crucial factor to which the judge should look.151
The doctrine of the equity of the statute appears to have been familiar
to the colonists of the Massachusetts Bay Colony; "Liberty 1" of the
Body of Liberties, for instance, recites that no man shall be in "any wayes
indamaged under colour of Law or countenance of Authoritie, unles it be
by the vertue or equity of some expresse law of the Country warranting the
same . .. .,.152 Arguments based on this rule of "equitable" construc-
tion were advanced in advocacy of the hanging of a boy convicted of the
rape of "a child of 7 or 8 years old." The offender was sentenced to be
severely whipped; there being no express law of God or of the colony
prescribing death as the punishment for his crime. "Yet," Winthrop noted,
"it may seem by the equity of the law against sodomy, that it should be
death, for a man to have carnal copulation with a girl so young, as there




The Discourse on Arbitrary Government was not limited to advocacy
of magisterial discretion. It also offered a definition of arbitrary govern-
ment as one "where a people have men sett ouer them without their
choyce, or allowance: who haue power, to Gouerne them, and Judge their
Causes without a Rule." 154 The government of Massachusetts was not
arbitrary, in the first place, because of "the Constant Libertye of the
Freemen, to choose yearly at the Court of Election, out of the Freemen,
all the generall Officers of this Jurisdiction." 155 The Massachusetts gov-
ernment met the second part of Winthrop's test inasmuch as its officers
were bound to govern the people and judge their cases in accordance with
a fundamental rule: ". . . the Officers of this Bodye Politick have a Rule
to walk by, in all their administrations, which Rule is the Worde of God,
and such conclusions and deductions, as are, or shalbe regularly drawne
from thence." 156
Winthrop's justification of the Massachusetts government also in-
volved an examination of the proper relations of its constituent parts to
one another. At the head were the Governor, Deputy Governor and
Assistants, in whom was vested "the power of Aut[horit]ye"; under
them were the Freemen, who exercised "the power of Liberty," entailing
active responsibilities in the colony's government, "and that vnder 2
151 Id. at 147.
152 BODY op LIBERTIES OF 1641 (liberty one), reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWs
OF MASSACHUSETTs 33 (Whitnore ed. 1899).
153 2 WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 116, at 37-38.
154 WINTHROP, mupra note 117, at 468.
155 Id. at 471.
156 Id. at 472.
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generall heads, Election and Counsell." The former power extended to
the choice of all "generall officers, viz.: such as should have influence
(either Juditiall or ministeriall) into all parts of the Jurisdiction." The
'liberty of counsel extended to all "lawes, decrees, or orders of any publ[ic]
nature or concernment," and to "taxes, impositions, impresses, or other
burdens of what kinde soeuer"; no such governmental act could be im-
posed upon the freemen without their "counsell and consent."' 
57
In addition to the "Rule" by which the officers of the government
were to be guided, Winthrop appears to have recognized in these rela-
tionships a second, "institutional" kind of fundamental law. He suggested
in his Defense of the Negative Vote that those aspects of government are
fundamental which make a "specificall difference betweene one forme of
Government and another." 158 He contended that the so-called "negative
vote," by which a simple majority of the Magistrates sitting in the Gen-
eral Court had a power of veto over the acts of the entire Court,' 59 was
"fundamental" in the institutional sense because in the event of its discard,
"our Government would be a meere Democratie, where now it is mixt.
. . ., Y60 The Puritan leaders were constantly concerned that the system
of "mixed aristocracy" which they had established should not degenerate
into a "meere Democratie." Thus, John Cotton was shocked by the sug-
gestion of an English correspondent that the popular choice of church and
civil officers practiced in Massachusetts would "lay such a foundation, as
nothing but a mere democracy can be built upon it." In refutation, he
cited "Bodine" for the proposition that though it be status popularis where
a people "choose their owne governors; yet the government is not a democ-
racy, if it be administered, not by the people, but by the governors,
whether one (for then it is a monarchy, though elective) or by many, for
then (as you know), it is aristocracy." 16I
Winthrop's descriptive, institutional conception of fundamental law
has a remarkably modern ring to it. His views differ little, for instance,
from Austin's definition of constitutional law as that which "determines
the persons or the classes of persons who shall bear the sovereign powers;
and . . . determines moreover the mode wherein such persons shall
share those powers," 162 or from Holland's statement that "the primary
function of constitutional law is to ascertain the political centre of gravity
of any given state .... In other words it defines the form of govern-
1
57 Id. at 468-69.
158 WINTHROP, Defense of the Negative Vote, in 4 WINTHROP PAPERS 382 (Mass.
Historical Soc'y 1944).
159 On the political dispute within the colony concerning the "Negative Vote,"
see generally HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 38-39 (1960).
160 WINTHROP, supra note 158, at 382-83.
161 Cotton, Copy of a Letter from Mr. Cotton to Lord Say and Seal in the Year
1636, in MILLER & JOHNSON, THE PURITANS 211 (1938).
1 62 
AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 73 (1873), quoted in MAITLAND, THE CoNSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 528 (1941).
1960] THE RULE OF LAW IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS 1031
ment." 163 Winthrop's definition of fundamental law in terms of institu-
tional arrangements, alteration of which would fundamentally subvert the
political structure, demonstrates awareness of the political realities, as well
as the theoretical niceties, of the function of fundamental law in society.
Limitation of Authority
Conflict between the purposes of government and law has been a
persistent theme in Anglo-American legal tradition.164 Such opposition is
implicit in the very idea of a body of fundamental law against which the
acts of authority may be assessed. The efforts of an important faction
of the Massachusetts colonists to limit the discretionary powers of the
magistrates by reference to "a body of grounds of laws, in resemblance
to a Magna Charta" 165 reflected the popular belief that the ends of law and
of government might in fact be widely divergent, so as to necessitate the
active limitation of the latter by the former. The Puritans were in the
forefront of the struggle to limit the prerogative powers of the English
Crown; it is not surprising, therefore, that a Puritan group attempted to
achieve substantially similar goals at the expense of the government of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony.
Paradoxically, the government which the "popular" party of Massa-
chusetts sought to limit was itself bottomed on the strictest Puritan ortho-
doxy. The intracolonial political maneuvering of the first two decades
illustrates the widely differing emphases to which the Puritan tradition
of fundamental law was susceptible. The position taken by Winthrop in
the matter of the magistrates' discretionary powers shows that a belief in
an immutable body of law applicable to the acts of human government
might be held consistently with a belief in the substantial identity of the
purposes of government and law. The persons who held political power
in Massachusetts during the earliest years were strongly influenced by
traditional Christian conceptions of human society as an organism, of
which the immediate end was temporal peace and well-being and the
ultimate end the advancement of the true religion through the church.
Convinced that rulers chosen with God's approbation by a covenant among
godly men must necessarily pursue ends conformable with the funda-
mental law revealed by Scripture and reason, and that God had promised
assistance to His earthly ministers so chosen, Winthrop and his followers
regarded the fundamental law not in terms of a brake upon authority, but
as an enhancement and justification of it.166
163 HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE 359 (10th ed. 1906), quoted in MAITLAND, Op. Cit.
supra note 162, at 532.
164 Haskins, Executive Justice and the Ride of Law, 30 SpEcULUm 529, 531 (1955).
165 1 WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 116, at 151.
166 That position could be supported by reference to Roman conceptions of jus
naturale as an ideal toward which actual law tended, rather than a standard from
which law constantly strayed. Unlike the later idea that the natural law should limit
human authority exteriorly, the Roman conception of natural law was that it bene-
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The problem of providing means of enforcing legal limitation of
government had baffled many of the political theorists who preceded the
Massachusetts Puritans. The ruler's adherence to the standards of a funda-
mental moral law was universally assumed to be the essence of a well-
ordered society, but historically, the political arrangements under which
men lived had provided few, if any, institutional guaranties of such ad-
herence. The elective "mixed aristocracy" of Massachusetts, however,
afforded an apparatus by which traditionally broad powers were assigned
to the office of the ruler, while an effective check upon their exercise was
exerted by the periodical popular choice of the persons to whom the
ruling power was given. John Winthrop recognized the function of the
popular election as a means of preserving both the integrity of the magis-
terial office and the people's right to be free from what James I bad
called "the faults of the person." 167 "The covenant between you and us,"
he told the people, "is . . . that we shall govern you and judge your
causes by the rules of God's laws and our own, according to our best
skill." The people, in choosing a magistrate, "must run the hazard of
his skill and ability." But if the ruler fails, not in skill and ability, but
in the faithfulness to the laws to which he is bound by his oath, then
"it must be required of him." 168 One way in which it might "be re-
quired of" a magistrate for acts exceeding his lawful authority was by
judicial proceedings in the General Court; 169 more significant, however,
was the power of the freemen to discharge a magistrate "without shewing
cause" at any annual Court of Elections.
170
Consent and the Organic State
Winthrop's statements respecting the constitutional relationship among
the magistrates, the deputies and the people, manifest the widely held
belief--expressed in Puritan conceptions of the social covenant-that the
people had owned political power originally and wholly, and had subse-
fited mankind by enlightening authority. Cf. CORWiN, THE "HIGHER LAw" BACK-
GROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22-23 (1955); GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL
LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 53-54 (1955). The older tradition had
its roots in Aristotle's recognition that the rule of law would ordinarily be exerted
through the influence upon rulers of "principles of rational generality," which he
elsewhere defined as "reason free from desire," for "he is a better ruler who is free
from passion than he who is governed by his impulses." See DICKINSON, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1927). Aris-
totle's view was familiar to the Massachusetts colonists; Thomas Hooker, who favored
legal and institutional checks upon governmental power, referred John Winthrop
somewhat inappositely to "what the Heathen man sayd by the candell light of com-
mon sense: The law is not subject to passion, nor to be taken with self seeking ends,
and therefore ought to have cheif rule over rulers them selves." Thomas Hooker to
John Winthrop, in 4 WINTHROP PAPERS 82 (Mass. Historical Soc'y 1944).
167 THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES I 315 (Mcllwain ed. 1918).
168 Winthrop, Speech to the General Court, Jidy 3, 1645, in MILLER & JOHNSON,
op. cit. supra note 161, at 206.
1
6
9 Id. at 205.
170 WINTHROP, Discourse on Arbitrary Government, in 4 WINTHROP PAPERS 471
(Mass. Historical Soc'y 1944).
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quently, by means of a compact, subjected themselves to government.
That belief is susceptible of varying applications. The theory of popular
sovereignty argues from the premise of consensual origin that the ruler
is the mere agent of the people, who retain all political power in them-
selves. On the other hand, the notion of limited sovereignty implies that
the people, by the terms of their agreement, continue to possess rights
whose existence limits the ruler in the exercise of the powers entrusted
to him. As a third alternative, the whole and undivided political power
of the people devolves upon the ruler by virtue of the social compact;
the people are left with little more than the right to assert a claim to the
ruler's fulfillment of his contractual obligation to rule them justly.
7 1
John Winthrop probably agreed with the third deduction. A thorough-
going authoritarian by training and inclination, he had scant confidence
in popular participation in the business of ruling Massachusetts. 172
D'Entr~ves has pointed out that the contract assumed two distinct
forms in the history of political thought. The first, the pactum unionis
or societatis, is an agreement by individuals to unite; the second, the
pactum subiectionis, is an agreement with a ruler to obey. The impor-
tance of the former in intellectual history derives from its usefulness as a
vehicle for the principle of the natural rights of the individual. The latter
posits that political power derives from the collective, not the individual
personality; its tendency is emphatically organic. 173 Winthrop was re-
luctant to accept the conflict of the individual and the state which is
implicit in the pactum societatis. However, from the time of the admission
of the deputies from the towns to the General Court,174 and even more
clearly after the enactment of the Body of Liberties in 1641, belief in the
value of individual rights was increasingly important in shaping the
colony's laws and institutions; the organic ideal which Winthrop favored
was correspondingly eroded. Pre-eminently a realist, Winthrop accom-
modated his political and constitutional arguments to the increasingly ap-
parent importance of the voice of the freemen in the colony's government.
He was not generous, however, in his estimation of the proper role
of the deputies in the government. Confronted with the argument that
"the greatest power is in the people: therefore it should be in their
Dep [u] tyes," he answered in a vein that is instructive as to his notion of the
effect of the consensual origin of the state. Conceding that "originally
and vertually" the political power is in the people, he nevertheless main-
171 See generally 1 GERx, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF Soc lY" 50-61
(1934).
172 WINTHROP, John/ Winthrop's Summary of His Letter to Thomas Hooker, in
4 WINTHROP PAPEms 53-54 (Mass. Historical Soe'y 1944) : "I expostulated about the
unwarrantableness and unsafeness of referring matter of counsel or judicature to the
body of the people, quia the best part is always the least, and of that best part the
wiser part is always the lesser."
1 73 D'ENTkvEs, THE MEDIEVAL CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL THOUGHT 129-31
(1939).
174 See generally HAsKINS, op. cit. supra note 159, at 30-31.
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tained that when the people have chosen their magistrates, their political
power "is actually in those to whom they have committed it.. .," 175
Inferentially, then, the deputies represent the people, not as they were
"originally and vertually," in full possession of political power, but as they
are "actually," having invested the magistrates with the "power of
Aut [horit] ye." 176 By this analysis the deputies represent the people only
as to the "power of liberty," which, Winthrop appears to concede, is inalien-
able. Although he recognized that the "power of liberty" which the people
exercised through the deputies included important political rights, Winthrop
insisted that the only legitimate "liberty" of the people of Massachusetts
was "a liberty to that only which is good, just, and honest." He further
asserted that this liberty was properly "maintained and exercised in a way
of subjection to authority" and was preserved, not by murmuring and
opposition, but by "upholding the honor and power of authority . . .." 177
Familiar only with political arrangements whose origins were lost
in the dimness of centuries past, political theorists of the postmedieval
period used the consensual origin of the state as little more than an hypoth-
esis to explain and justify existing governmental institutions. For the Mas-
sachusetts colonists, on the other hand, the notion that the state derives its
existence and its powers from the consent of the persons governed was not a
mere scholarly convention. Accustomed by religious teaching to think in
terms of covenant, the colonists readily perceived an actual social compact in
the annual election of governmental officers by the freemen-periodically
renewed by ruler, by subject, and by God Himself through His use of them
as secondary natural causes. 78 They were encouraged in this notion by the
sermons preached on election day. The ministers regularly warned the
electors against the consequences of frivolous change. .John Cotton, for
instance, declared in an early election sermon "that a magistrate ought not
to be turned into the condition of a private man without just cause, and to be
publickly convict, no more than the magistrates may not turn a private man
out of his freehold." 179 To speak of an officeholder's tenure under an
elective system in terms of a "freehold" may appear to be anomalous, but the
relative infrequency with which magistrates were in fact "turned into the
condition of a private man" during the first twenty years of the colony's
history 180 suggests that election sermons such as Cotton's had considerable
effect.
The free annual election of governmental officers had the approval of
Puritan covenant doctrine, but its immediate legal basis was the royal
charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company. Indeed, the political history
175 WINTHROP, supra note 158, at 390.
176 See note 157 vtpra and accompanying text.
177 Winthrop, sepra note 168, at 206-07.
178 See notes 108-13 .supra and accompanying text.
179 1 WINTHROP, THE HISTORY OF NEw ENGLAND FROM 1630 TO 1649, at 257
(Savage ed. 1825).
180 See HASKINS, op. cit. supra note 159, at 53.
1960] THE RULE OF LAW IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS 1035
of the colony during its first twenty years might be characterized as an
accommodation of strongly felt popular beliefs in the limitation of authority
to the organizational structure of a seventeenth century trading company
controlled by men of strong authoritarian tendencies. The structure of the
Massachusetts Bay Company was broadly similar to that of other English
trading companies of the time. The "general court" of the Massachusetts
charter, as well as the "freemen" and the annually elected "governor,"
"deputy governor," and "assistants" who comprised it, had close counter-
parts in the royal charters of such companies as the Merchants Trading
to France '8 ' and the African Company. 8 2  Superficially democratic in its
internal government and procedures, the trading company was strongly
marked by the organic and authoritarian bent that was a feature of the
medieval merchants' gild from which it derived.8 3 At any rate, the small
group in control during the earliest years, which sought to adapt "the
machinery of a simple business organism to the requirements of a body
politic," 1s4 found it possible at the outset to use that machinery to exercise
a rigid supervision over the public and private lives of the colonists. But
as the number of freemen increased and their political awareness and ac-
tivity grew more evident, the more liberal possibilities of the corporate
trading company structure took on large practical importance in
Massachusetts.
Individual Liberties and Codification
Partly because of the continuing influence of the clergy upon the elec-
torate, John Winthrop's belief that government was principally limited by
the ruler's conscience and self-restraint, and his insistence upon the virtue
of the people's obedience to their betters continued to be a vital force in the
administration of the colony's affairs during the first two decades. How-
ever, it was gradually supplemented by an increasing emphasis upon specific
individual rights. The most important manifestation of this trend was the
General Court's enactment in 1641 of the Body of Liberties,'8 5 a collection
of fundamental laws embodying numerous specific guaranties of the rights
of the individual as against the government.
Nathaniel Ward, who is reputed to have drafted the Body of Liberties,
was trained, like Winthrop, in the common law. 8 6 But he appears to have
been influenced far more than Winthrop by ideas, then gaining currency in
181 SELECT CHARERS OF TRADING COMNPANIES, A.D. 1530-1707, at 68 (Carr ed.
1918).
182 1d. at 100-01.
183 HASKINS, op. cit. supra note 159, at 58-59.
184 Id. at 25.
I
8
s The text of the Body of Liberties is reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETTS 32-61 (Whitmore ed. 1889).
186 See the biographical essay on Ward in MORISON, BuILDERs OF THE BAY COLONY
217-43 (1930). Ward "studied and practised law . . . for about ten years" before
entering the ministry. Id. at 220.
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England, that governmental authority should be limited by specific, in-
violable rights and privileges guaranteed to the subject. Winthrop and
John Cotton,18 7 with varying emphases, set up the Word of God as the
standard by which the limits of the magistrate's power must be determined;
Ward agreed that "Morall Laws, Royall Prerogatives, Popular Liberties,
are not of Mans making or giving, but Gods: Man is but to measure them
out by Gods Rule: which," he added significantly, "if mans wisdome can-
not reach, Mans experience must mend." 188 Ward was firm, however, that
"these Essentialls, must not be Ephorized or Tribuned by one or a few
Mens discretion, but lineally sanctioned by Supreame Councels," and that
the safeguards inherent in representation be reinforced by fundamental in-
struments specifying and guaranteeing the respective rights and powers
of ruler and subject:
"Yet it were good if States would let People know so much before
hand, by some safe woven manifesto, that grosse Delinquents may tell
no tales of Anchors and Buoyes, nor paliate their presumptions with
pretence of ignorance. . . . And in all, the best Standard to measure
Prerogatives, is the Plough-staffe; to measure Liberties, the Scepter: if
the tearmes were a little altered into Loyall Prerogatives and Royall
Liberties, then we should be sure to have Royall Kings and Loyall
Subjects." 189
Ward, no less than Winthrop, assumes the organic nature of society
and government. His recognition of the importance of personal rights
does not imply an opposition between the ends of the individual and those
of the state. On the contrary, an harmonious accommodation of the col-
lective rights of society exerted through the ruler, on the one hand, and the
rights of the individual, on the other, is implicit in his striking figure of the
ploughstaff and the sceptre. That attitude is entirely consistent with opin-
ions repeatedly expressed by Winthrop. The Massachusetts Code of 1648,
wherein the principle of limitation of government by specific legal rules
and guaranties found its most complete expression, was prefaced by an
epistle which expressed the organic conception of the commonwealth in
words that might have been written by Winthrop himself.19
R.H.C.
187 Cotton, Limitation of Government, in MILE & JiOHNSON, op. cit. supra note
161, at 212-14.
188 Ward, The Simple Cobler of Aggawam in America, in MILER & JOHNSON,
op. cit. supra note 161, at 226, 236.
189 Ibid.
190 Cf. HASKINS, op. cit. s11pra note 159, at 140.
